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Adaptive decisions require that decision makers factor in the 
subjective values of different possible outcomes, and the 
probability of these outcomes occurring. Subjective values 
depend, among other things, on how far an outcome is away in 
time. This can be captured by assessing an individual’s delay 
discounting of different options. An individual’s risk 
preference also affects how attractive particular choice options 
appear to them. In humans, probability discounting and delay 
discounting are often related. People who show more risky 
behaviors also tend to be more impulsive and less patient. 
Based on such findings, single-process models of delay 
discounting and probability discounting have been suggested. 
In the current study, we tested if this relationship is equally 
present in chimpanzees, one of human’s closest extant 
evolutionary relatives. We presented 23 chimpanzees with a 
patience task and a risky-choice task. The patience task was 
designed to explicitly distinguish between delay preference and 
self-control (i.e., the ability to wait a given delay). Still, we 
found no strong correlations between risk and delay 
preferences. As this task has not been used with humans before, 
we implemented a computerized version and tested it in a 
sample of twenty adult participants. Initial results indicate that 
the task is well suited to capture patience, and it makes a 
promising candidate to be used in behavioral delay discounting 
experiments in humans.  
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Introduction  
Most animals, including humans, are regularly confronted 
with situations where they have to decide between outcomes 
that occur at different times. The value of rewards is often 
discounted over time; this means the subjective value of a 
reward decreases the longer one has to wait for it. Adaptive 
choice of reward options requires weighing reward features 
such as size, desirability, or perishableness against delayed 
pay-out time.  
Implicit risk theory suggests that delay discounting can be 
explained by delayed rewards affording more risk and 
uncertainty as compared to immediate rewards. As a result, 
perceived risk and an individual’s risk preference are directly 
related to an individual’s delay discounting and resulting 
decisions. Empirical evidence from humans lends support to 
this possibility and suggests that delay discounting and 
probability discounting might build on a single underlying 
process or at least share substantial variance components (for 
example, Benzion et al., 1989; Bixter & Luhmann, 2015; 
Mishra & Lalumière, 2017; see Johnson et al., 2020, for a 
meta-analytic overview and discussion of mixed evidence for 
single-process models). 
Delay discounting has also been studied in other animals, 
including chimpanzees, one of humans’ two closest, living 
primate relatives (for example, Beran et al., 2014; Beran & 
Hopkins, 2018; Paglieri et al., 2013; Rosati et al., 2007; 
Stevens et al., 2011; Stevens & Stephens, 2010).  
Chimpanzees can wait several minutes for a ‘larger-later’ 
reward option. Given this general ability to delay immediate 
gratification, the question arises whether delay discounting 
and risk preference are similarly related in chimpanzees. If 
we were to find similar correlations as seen for humans, this 
might indicate that delay discounting and probability 
discounting co-evolved and have brought about certain 
“types of decision-makers” already in the last common 
ancestor of human and chimpanzees. If delay discounting and 
risk preference are independent processes in chimpanzees but 
related in humans, this might indicate fundamental 
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differences in cognitive decision-making architecture 
between the species.  
The goal of the current study was to investigate whether 
the relationship of delay discounting and probability 
discounting is a human-specific effect, or is shared with a 
closely related primate species, the chimpanzee. To do so, we 
tested a group of chimpanzees in a risky-choice experiment 
and a patience experiment. Furthermore, we implemented a 
computerized human version of the chimpanzee patience 
task, known as the Hybrid Delay Task (HDT; Beran et al., 
2014; Beran & Hopkins, 2018; Paglieri et al., 2013). The 
HDT is a two-step task, with step 1 using a binary choice to 
assess delay preferences and step 2 constituting a waiting task 
to assess delay abilities. This task has not been used in 
humans before but given its power to dissociate a preference 
for ‘larger-later’ rewards from the ability to maintain delays, 
we think it makes a good candidate to provide additional 
insights into human inter-temporal choices. 
Methods - Chimpanzees  
Subjects  
We tested 23 chimpanzees (11 males, 12 females, age range 
12–35 years) from Ngamba Island Chimpanzee Sanctuary, 
Uganda (https://ngambaisland.org/). The chimpanzees were 
tested individually in a familiar room of the holding facility. 
The chimpanzees were never food deprived for this study and 
could stop participating at any time. Usually, they signalled 
this by leaving the testing area, climbing up into their 
hammocks, or approaching the closed door to the forest. 
Water was always available ad libitum. The current research 
was approved by the University of Warwick research ethics 
committee and the Chimpanzee Sanctuary and Wildlife 
Conservation Trust (CSWCT) as well as the Uganda Wildlife 
Authority and the Uganda National Council for Science and 
Technology (UWA/COD/96/05). 
Procedure  
All chimpanzees participated in a patience experiment and a 
risky-choice experiment. We used established methodologies 
to test both behaviors. Before each experiment, we conducted 
numerical discrimination tests and familiarization trials to 
ensure that the chimpanzees could discriminate the quantities 
involved and understood the respective experimental 
procedure. 
Presentation order of tasks and conditions wasn’t 
counterbalanced across chimpanzees because this experiment 
assessed the correlations between individual differences in 
risky choice and delay discounting, making it important to 
provide all individuals with the same stimuli and order of 
conditions and tasks (see Goodhew & Edwards, 2019). As a 
consequence, all chimpanzees experienced the risk task 
before the HDT with the break between the tasks ranging 
from three weeks to six months (dictated by testing 
opportunities in the sanctuary). Importantly, in neither of the 
two tasks did the experimenter behave unreliably or 
deceptively towards the chimpanzees, i.e., she always 
provided the chosen option and never suddenly aborted the 
procedure or provided unexpected or random rewards. 
Hence, we do not expect any carry-over effects that could 
render the HDT additionally risky and that would bias the 
chimpanzees to play it safe and choose the immediate option 
due to a social risk from the experimenter. 
 
Patience Experiment In the patience task, we used the 
Hybrid Delay Task (HDT) that separately assesses delay 
preference as well as the ability to maintain the delay during 
an accumulation procedure. The HDT is well suited to 
dissociate a preference for larger rewards from patience or 
self-control.  
Figure 1 illustrates the apparatus and test set-up. Before the 
main task, chimpanzees received two kinds of familiarization 
sessions. These sessions all consisted of eight trials: on four 
trials, chimpanzees received the small-immediate reward (4 
pieces), and on four trials, chimpanzees received the large-
delayed reward (up to 12 pieces). First, every individual 
received one session where the accumulation platform was 
out of reach. Only once all items were placed onto the 
platform did the experimenter push the platform within reach. 
Second, we presented sessions where the accumulation 
platform was within reach. Here, the chimpanzees could 
experience that the experimenter stopped adding items as 
soon as they pulled the platform or began to eat from it. To 
ensure the chimpanzees understood this rationale, they had to 
wait for at least six food items in three of the four large-
delayed trials within a session. Two individuals received 
three such sessions, eight individuals received two sessions, 
and fourteen individuals only needed one session.  
We then introduced the two delay test conditions: 3 s and 
10 s. Each experimental session consisted of eight trials, with 
four experimental sessions per condition. All individuals 
received the four sessions in the 3s condition first. A session 
began with two forced-choice trials – one small-immediate 
trial and one large-delayed trial (order counterbalanced 
across sessions), with the corresponding transfer speed (3 or 
10 s) as per condition. These initial trials served as a reminder 
of the test procedure and indicated to the chimpanzees which 
delay condition was in force for that session. The other six 
trials in each session were test trials (resulting in a total of 24 
test trials per condition per chimpanzee).  
In both conditions, chimpanzees first chose between a 
small-immediate reward consisting of four pieces of food and 
a large-delayed reward consisting of twelve pieces of food. If 
a subject chose the small option, the experimenter transferred 
all pieces immediately onto the accumulation platform for the 
chimpanzee to eat. If a subject chose the large option, the 
experimenter began to place one piece after another onto the 
accumulation platform at a rate of one piece every three or 
every ten seconds depending on condition (see Figure 1). The 
inter-trial interval was adjusted according to delay condition 
and was set at 120 s for the 3s condition and 180 s for the 10s 
condition to ensure that all trials within a condition were of 
equal length. This means the start of the next trial couldn’t be 
brought about more quickly by choosing the small-immediate 
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option or by accumulating fewer items. For each individual, 
we assessed: (i) the number of collected food items, (ii) how 
often they picked the large option, and (iii) how often they 
accumulated four or fewer items after having picked the large 
option (later also referred to as ‘errors’, because four is the 
number of food items they could have gotten immediately 




Figure 1: HDT chimpanzee test setup during 
accumulation phase. Here is depicted a trial in which the 
subject chose the large-delayed option. The experimenter 
added each piece one by one onto the green accumulation 
platform. If the subject pulled the green platform, the 
experimenter stopped adding rewards.  
 
 
Risky-Choice Experiment In the risky-choice experiment, 
chimpanzees decided repeatedly (sixty trials) between an 
option with a constant medium reward outcome and a risky 
option with a large or zero outcome with a 50/50 chance. We 
also assessed each individual’s indifference point between 
safe and risky options by applying a titration procedure with 
choice-dependent adaptation of the size of the safe option: 
after a risky choice in the previous trial, the safe option of the 
current trial was increased by 1 piece of food; after a safe 
choice in the previous trial, the safe option was decreased by 
1. Dependent variables in this experiment were the proportion 
of risky choices and the average size of the safe option 
resulting from the titration experiment. In this paper, our 
focus is on the HDT results and the relation between HDT 
measures and risky choice. More details on the risky-choice 
procedure can be found in a recent publication by Keupp et 
al. (2021). 
 
Coding and analysis. The experimenter coded all HDT 
sessions either live or from video. A second coder, who was 
blind to the purpose of the study, coded 25% of the videos. 
Coder agreement was very good for each variable: choice 
(Cohen’s kappa =.99) and number of accumulated items 
(Spearman’s rho =.99).  
We assessed the number of small and large choices and how 
many items were accumulated per individual and delay 
condition. All analyses were performed within the R 
statistical computing environment (version 3.6.2). We ran 
separate linear mixed models to test for the effect of delay 
condition on initial choice, number of accumulated items in 
general, number of accumulated items after choosing the 
large option, number of errors, and effect of session number 
within condition on initial choice. Models were fitted using 
the functions glmer, lmer, and lm of the package lme4 (Bates 
et al., 2016). The formulated full models included condition 
as a fixed predictor of interest, subjects as a random effect, 
and random slope of condition within subject. One model 
additionally included the interaction of condition and session 
number in the fixed-effects structure. Session number was z-
transformed and included as a random slope within subject. 
We compared these full models with the respective null 
models without the fixed-effect predictors (see here for more 
details on models and analysis: https://osf.io/54qdr/). For all 
models, we checked model stability by comparing the 
estimates from the models based on all data with those from 
models with the levels of the random effects excluded one at 
a time, and where necessary checked for collinearity by 
determining the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF, Field, 2009) 
for a linear model excluding the random effects. There were 
no obvious deviations from assumptions and no indications 
for model instability and problematic issues with variance 
inflation. We calculated conditional R2 effect sizes using the 
function r.squaredGLMM of the package MuMIn (Bartón, 
2020). 
Results - Chimpanzees  
 
Overall, chimpanzees picked the large option 78% (3s) and 
72% (10s) of the time. The individual chimpanzees were 
consistent in their behavior in the HDT, as is apparent from a 
strong positive correlation between an individual’s delay 
preference and the number of accumulated rewards (3s: r = 
.913, p < .001; 10s: r = .808, p < .001). This preference did 
not reliably differ between delay conditions (χ2 = 1.90, df = 
1, p < .17, conditional R2 = 0.118). 
We also observed group differences, however, between the 
delay conditions. Figure 2 displays the average number of 
food items collected and the number of errors for each 
chimpanzee. The chimpanzees collected more food items in 
the 3s condition compared to the 10s condition (χ2 = 11.73, 
df = 1, p < .001, conditional R2 = 0.437). After choosing the 
large option, they accumulated on average more food rewards 
in the 3s condition (9.5 items) than in the 10s condition (8.1 
items) (χ2 = 9.81, df = 1, p < .01, conditional R2 = 0.423; see 
Figure 2A). Moreover, they made more errors (i.e., 
accumulating only four or fewer rewards after picking the 
larger option) in the 10s condition than in the 3s condition (χ2 









Figure 2: HDT performance chimpanzees. A: 
Individuals’ average number of accumulated rewards 
after choosing the large option. B: Number of errors per 
individual. In all boxplots in this paper, horizontal lines 
represent median (thick line) and 25th & 75th percentiles; 
Whiskers extend to smallest and largest value within 1.5 
* interquartile range  
 
 
Furthermore, we found a significant interaction of delay 
condition and session. Each chimpanzee received four 
sessions of each delay condition. Whereas choice of the large 
option remained relatively stable in the 3s sessions, the 
probability of picking the large option decreased across 
sessions in the 10s condition (χ2 = 21.22, df = 3, p < .001, 
conditional R2 = 0.497). This decrease indicates that with 
increasing experience, chimpanzees adapted their delay 
choice to their ability or willingness to wait for the 
accumulating food.  
Finally, we observed no strong correlations between any of 
the measures in the HDT and the risky-choice experiment in 
these chimpanzees. The numerically highest observed 
correlation was found between number of obtained rewards 
in the 10s condition and size of the safe option in the risky-
choice titration paradigm (r = 0.37, p = .083): the more 
rewards were obtained in the 10s condition the riskier 
chimpanzees behaved in the risky-choice task. 
Discussion - Chimpanzees  
We found that chimpanzees preferentially chose the large 
option in both delay conditions, but were better able to 
maintain the delay in the 3s condition than the 10s condition. 
While delay choice and delay maintenance were strongly 
correlated overall, this difference between delay conditions 
might nevertheless indicate that delay choice does not always 
capture an individuals’ ability to exert patience or self-
control: The longer a delay has to be maintained, the higher 
the probability that the initial ‘larger-later’ choice doesn’t 
reflect an individual’s self-control ability. Our results also 
suggest that the chimpanzees seemed to learn from their 
mistakes and adapted their strategy, as indicated by their 
decreasing tendency to pick the large option over the course 
of the 10s delay sessions. After choosing the large option at 
a relatively stable level in the 3s delay sessions, they first had 
to experience the new delay condition and then started to 
adapt their choice strategy.  
Our findings complement previous work where 
chimpanzees were in principle ‘successful’ in the HDT in that 
they accumulated more items after choosing the larger 
delayed option than the amount contained in the small-
immediate option (Beran et al., 2014). Like our chimpanzees, 
the individuals in Beran et al.’s study also showed individual 
differences in the extent to which they could sustain the 
delay.  
Within the HDT, chimpanzees all experienced the 3s 
condition first. This consistent ordering means that we cannot 
exclude the possibility that the difference between 3s and 10s 
delay conditions is a general effect of repeated participation 
in the task. To further examine this possibility, we assessed 
the evolution of individuals’ decisions across sessions in each 
condition and found that the probability to pick the large 
option was highly stable across the four sessions in the 3s 
condition, whereas it dropped in the last two sessions of the 
10s condition. We interpret this imbalance as a hint that the 
condition effect was more related to the longer delay than a 
general effect of test session.  
The central finding for the purpose of this paper is that 
chimpanzees’ performance in the HDT did not correlate with 
their risk preference. This independence indicates that, unlike 
in humans, risky choice might not be strongly correlated with 
patience in chimpanzees and that the relationship of delay 
discounting and probability discounting may be specific to 
humans. Alternatively, the HDT might be a task that captures 
patience in a “purer” way, i.e. free of a risk component. This 
makes the HDT a good candidate to provide additional 
insights into human inter-temporal preferences. To explore 
this further, we implemented a computerized human version 
of the HDT – a task that has not previously been used with 
human participants.  
Methods - Humans  
Participants 
We tested twenty UK-based participants (mean age = 27.0 
years, 11 males, 8 females, 1 non-binary) recruited via the 
online platform Prolific Academic (prolific.co). Participants 
were paid £2.50 for the 20-minute experiment and could earn 
a performance-dependent bonus payment of up to £6.40 
(actual range = £0.10-£6.40). All participants provided 
informed consent, and the experiment was approved by the 
University of Warwick Humanities and Social Science 
Research Ethics Committee (HSSREC). 
Procedure 
We adapted the HDT task used with chimpanzees to be 
presented to adult human participants via an online 
experiment using oTree (Chen et al., 2016). Figure 3 shows a 
task schematic. Participants saw four trials. In each trial, they 
could first choose between a small-immediate reward of one 
coin or a large-delayed reward of sixteen coins (each coin 
was worth £0.10). They knew they would only see four trials, 
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which alleviated the need to hold the intertrial interval 
constant in this case. If they chose the small option, they 
received one coin into their bank immediately. If they chose 
the large option, an accumulation process began, whereby the 
coins would slowly move across the screen to transfer one-
by-one into their bank at a rate of 15 s per transfer (i.e., 240 s 
maximum trial length for sixteen coins). Participants could 
stop the process at any time by clicking a stop button (see 
Figure 3). To prevent participants from spending their time 
with other activities while waiting for the transfer of the coins 
to their bank, they had to monitor the browser window at all 
times to click on a stimulus that appeared seldomly, but 




Figure 3: Schematic of the accumulation process in the 
HDT human version. Coins would slowly move from the 
pile (on the left) to the piggy bank (on the right), and 
participant could press the red “Stop” button at any time 
to collect the money collected thus far. The grey square 
in the top left corner is the rarely occurring, to-be-clicked 
stimulus to avoid timing out from the trial. 
 
Results and Discussion - Humans 
Participants chose the large option on average 86.3% of the 
time (SD = 23.6). Figure 4 shows how they accumulated on 
average 13.9 (SD = 4.1) coins per round in which they chose 
the large option, and they accumulated on average 47.2 coins 
across all rounds (SD = 18.6) out of a maximum possible 64. 
Those participants who chose the large option more often also 
accumulated on average more coins (r = 0.878, p < .001). 
Only three errors occurred across all participants and trials, 
i.e., only three times did a participant choose the large option 






Figure 4: HDT performance humans. A. Total number of 
coins per participant. B. Average number of accumulated 
coins per participant after choosing the large option. 
 
These findings indicate that human participants could 
maintain the delay after choosing the delayed option and thus 
made rational choices most of the time. They exhibited a 
consistent pattern of delay choice and delay maintenance. 
Assessment of participants’ comments revealed that the task 
is likely measuring what we intended: many participants 
reported they had to force themselves to remain patient about 
the painfully slowly moving coins, that they sometimes 
picked the small option because they were tired of waiting, 
and that they opted for a mixed strategy to trade-off waiting 
and higher payoff. 
General Discussion and Outlook 
Based on findings that delay discounting and probability 
discounting correlate among experimental measures as well 
as real-life behavior in humans (for example, Benzion et al., 
1989; Bixter & Luhmann, 2015; Johnson et al., 2020; Mishra 
& Lalumière, 2017), we tested for this relationship in 
chimpanzees to address the question if this correspondence is 
a human-specific effect. We found no relationship between 
chimpanzees’ behaviour in a patience task and their risk 
preferences. A computerized version of the HDT worked well 
in an initial sample of human participants, and this instrument 
is a promising candidate to be used in future behavioural 
delay discounting experiments. 
Our goal in the current study was not to directly compare 
performance of chimpanzees and humans in the HDT. 
Considering the small sample size and that no variations of 
the task were being compared in humans, we cannot make 
strong inferences from the human data at this point. What we 
report here are first steps toward implementing a delay 
discounting task that is less abstract and descriptive than the 
widely-used, questionnaire-based intertemporal choice tasks 
(e.g., Kirby & Maraković, 1996) and that can dissociate a 
preference for larger-delayed rewards from the ability to 
maintain delays. Research on the Description-Experience 
Gap has established that risk preferences can differ 
depending on how options are encountered, namely whether 
they are described to participants verbally or whether 
participants experience the odds and outcomes directly (see 
e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). For delay 
discounting, it might similarly make a difference whether 
participants receive explicitly described information about 
the delay options, or whether they need to actively maintain 
an experienced delay (see Dai et al., 2019). Crucial next steps 
will be to vary the parameters of the HDT (reward size of the 
options, speed of reward transition into the bank, whether 
participants know the number of decisions in advance, 
immediate gratification), to test the task with a larger sample, 
and look at potential correlates of the HDT with different 
measures from the human literature. Once the HDT yields 
sufficient variation between individuals, we will assess 
relationships between HDT and established risk preference 
procedures in humans.  
For a direct comparison between humans and nonhuman 
primates it will be important to align additional procedural 
details as best as possible, such as the immediacy of 
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gratification and opportunities for distraction. Furthermore, it 
would be important to test additional samples of chimpanzees 
with a combination of risky choice and HDT task to assess if 
the low association replicates.  
 
Acknowledgments 
We are thankful to L. Ajarova, J. Rukundo, T. Mukungu, and 
the trustees and all the staff of the Chimpanzee Sanctuary and 
Wildlife Conservation Trust (CSWCT) for their continuous 
help and support. In particular, we appreciate the hard work 
of the animal caregivers and their support helping us to con- 
duct the experiments. We also appreciate permission from the 
Ugandan National Council for Science and Technology and 
the Uganda Wildlife Authority for allowing us to conduct our 
research in Uganda (Research permit UWA/COD/96/05). We 
thank T. Batistoni for help with programming and S. Donnier 
for reliability coding. We thank the ESRC, NSF and EU 
Horizon 2020 grant programmes for their support. This work 
was funded by a collaborative grant from the Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) awarded to A.P.M. and 
E.A.L. (grant no. ES/R008353/2) and the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) awarded to F.W. (grant no. 1901661) 
References  
Bartón, K. (2020). MuMIn: Multi-Model Inference (R 
package version 1.43.17). https://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=MuMIn 
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). 
Fitting linear mixed-effects models using lme4. Journal of 
Statistical Software, 67(1). 
https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v067.i01 
Benzion, U., Rapoport, A., & Yagil, J. (1989). Discount rates 
inferred from decisions: An experimental study. 
Management Science, 35(3), 270–284. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.35.3.270 
Beran, M. J., Evans, T. A., Paglieri, F., McIntyre, J. M., 
Addessi, E., & Hopkins, W. D. (2014). Chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes) can wait, when they choose to: A study with 
the hybrid delay task. Animal Cognition, 17(2), 197–205. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-013-0652-9 
Beran, M. J., & Hopkins, W. D. (2018). Self-Control in 
chimpanzees relates to general intelligence. Current 
Biology, 28(4), 574-579.e3. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2017.12.043 
Bixter, M. T., & Luhmann, C. C. (2015). Evidence for 
implicit risk: Delay facilitates the processing of 
uncertainty. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 
28(4), 347–359. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1853 
Chen, D. L., Schonger, M., & Wickens, C. (2016). oTree—
An open-source platform for laboratory, online, and field 
experiments. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental 
Finance, 9, 88–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbef.2015.12.001 
Dai, J., Pachur, T., Pleskac, T. J., & Hertwig, R. (2019). What 
the future holds and when: A description–experience gap 
in intertemporal choice. Psychological Science, 30(8), 
1218–1233. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619858969 
Field, A. P. (2009). Discovering statistics using SPSS: And 
sex, drugs and rock ‘n’ roll (3rd ed). SAGE Publications. 
Goodhew, S. C., & Edwards, M. (2019). Translating 
experimental paradigms into individual-differences 
research: Contributions, challenges, and practical 
recommendations. Consciousness and Cognition, 69, 14–
25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2019.01.008 
Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E. U., & Erev, I. (2004). 
Decisions from experience and the effect of rare events in 
risky choice. Psychological Science, 15(8), 534–539. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00715.x 
Johnson, K. L., Bixter, M. T., & Luhmann, C. C. (n.d.). Delay 
discounting and risky choice: Meta-analytic evidence 
regarding single-process theories. Judgment and Decision 
Making, 15(3), 381–400. 
Keupp, S., Grueneisen, S., Ludvig, E. A., Warneken, F., & 
Melis, A. P. (2021). Reduced risk-seeking in chimpanzees 
in a zero-outcome game. Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 376(1819), 
20190673. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2019.0673 
Kirby, K. N., & MarakoviĆ, N. N. (1996). Delay-discounting 
probabilistic rewards: Rates decrease as amounts increase. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 3(1), 100–104. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03210748 
Ludvig, E. A., & Spetch, M. L. (2011). Of black swans and 
tossed coins: Is the description-experience gap in risky 
choice limited to rare events? PLoS ONE, 6(6), e20262. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0020262 
Mishra, S., & Lalumière, M. L. (2017). Associations between 
delay discounting and risk-related behaviors, traits, 
attitudes, and outcomes. Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 30(3), 769–781. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2000 
Paglieri, F., Focaroli, V., Bramlett, J., Tierno, V., McIntyre, 
J. M., Addessi, E., Evans, T. A., & Beran, M. J. (2013). 
The hybrid delay task: Can capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) sustain a delay after an initial choice to do so? 
Behavioural Processes, 94, 45–54. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2012.12.002 
Rosati, A. G., Stevens, J. R., Hare, B., & Hauser, M. D. 
(2007). The evolutionary origins of human patience: 
Temporal preferences in chimpanzees, bonobos, and 
human adults. Current Biology, 17(19), 1663–1668. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.08.033 
Stevens, J. R., Rosati, A. G., Heilbronner, S. R., & Mühlhoff, 
N. (2011). Waiting for grapes: Expectancy and delayed 
gratification in bonobos. International Journal of 
Comparative Psychology, 24(1), 99–111. Retrieved from 
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4km2r37j 
Stevens, J. R., & Stephens, D. W. (2010). The adaptive nature 
of impulsivity. In G. J. Madden & W. K. Bickel (Eds.), 
Impulsivity: The behavioral and neurological science of 
discounting. (pp. 361–387). American Psychological 
Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/12069-013 
 
49
